

XXIX.

CALIFORNIA—THE YOSEMITE.

BEAR VALLEY, Cal., Aug. 14, 1859.

By zigzags the north face of the all but perpendicular mountain, our moonlight soon left us, or was present only by reflection from the opposite cliff. Soon, the trail became at once so steep, so rough and so tortuous, that we all dismounted, but my attempt at walking proved a miserable failure. I had been riding with a bad Mexican stirrup, which hereby admitted the toes of my left foot, and continual pressure on these had sprained and swelled them so that walking was positive torture. I persisted in the attempt till my companions insisted on my remounting, and thus floundered slowly to the bottom. By steady effort we descended the three walls (4,000 feet perpendicular) in two hours, and

I shall not multiply details, nor waste paper in noting all the foolish names which foolish people have given to different peaks or turrets. Just think of two giant stone towers or pillars, which rise a thousand feet above the towering cliff which forms their base, being styled "The Two Sisters." Could anything be more maladroit and lackadaisical? "The Dome" is a high, round, naked peak, which rises between the Merced and its little tributary from the inner recesses of the Sierra Nevada already instanced, and which towers to an altitude of over five thousand feet above the waters at its base. Picture to yourself a perpendicular wall of bare granite nearly or quite one mile high! Yet there are some dozen or score of peaks in all, ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 feet above the Valley, and a biscuit tossed from any of them would strike very near its base, and its fragments go bounding and falling still further. I certainly miss here the Glaciers of Chamonix; but I know no single wonder of Nature on earth which can claim a superiority over the Yosemite. Just dream yourself for one hour in a chasm nearly ten miles long, with egress for birds and water out at either extremity, and none elsewhere save at three points, up the face of precipices from 3,000 to 4,000 feet high, the chasm scarcely more than a mile wide at any point, and tapering to a mere gorge or cañon at either end.

EUROPE

KOSSUTH AND LOUIS NAPOLEON.

"I have," said Mr. Kossuth, "already alluded to my other lecture, to the broth of national hatred which Louis Bonaparte is brewing. I do not mean to insinuate that he is meditating an invasion of this country; no doubt he would: only, like the fox in the fable, he does not like his grapes. It is not long ago that, with the exception of the Emperor of the French, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, all the world were at his mystery. Louis Bonaparte put the whole diplomacy of the world to their wit's end by his gigantic preparations at Cherbourg, pushed on to the last stilling of his empty treasury, and with a haste as if his existence were depending on a public guillotine of St. Petersburg running a structure solely against England. He meditates a new conflict in the East, in company with Russia. In this conflict he means to check the free movement of the English navy by binding its prodigious portion of it to your shores, while he proposes to strike a deadly blow at your vital interests in the East. . . . He means to secure the interests of Great Britain and Turkey, Wallachia and Moldavia, give a constitution devised in the den of secret diplomacy, that curse of our age; a constitution devised by Bonaparte with the concurrence of Russia and Austria—each and all of them ardent friends of the popular despotism of France. It is not the more to be feared that the Emperor granted to Russia for the purpose of disposing of the Principality of Moldavia. . . . Nay, more; has not Bonaparte, his dear ally, sent his officers to Montenegro to teach him practice to the wild mountaineers. . . . His mind is bent on the new treaty of Tilsit, if he has not already signed it in a pocket."

Such were Kossuth's public strictures on Bonaparte, his dear ally, in the Autumn of 1858. Still more; in the beginning of 1859, when Bonaparte's plans for his Italian crusade of liberty had begun to take shape and figure, this same Kossuth, who

As to Mr. Kosuth's repudiation of Republicanism, I consider it to have been sincere. A civil list of 300,000 florins, which he claimed at Pesth for keeping up the splendor of the Executive; the patronage of the hospitals, transferred from an Austrian Archduchess to his own sister; the attempt to give his name to some regiments; his desire to surround himself with a camarilla; the tenacity with which, when on foreign soil, he clung to the title of Governor, although resigned by him at the epoch of the Hungarian catastrophe; the airs assumed by him of a pretender, rather than an exile—all this points to tendencies the reverse of Republicanism. However that may be, I positively affirm that Louis Kosuth abjured Republicanism before the French usurper, and in the presence of the Man of December offered the Hungarian crown to Flon-Flon, the Bonapartist Sardanapalus. Some rather loose gossip about this incident of his interview with Bonaparte at the Tuileries may have given rise to the notoriously false rumor that Kosuth had betrayed the secret plans of his Republic to an ex-confederate. He was not called upon to reveal their supposed secrets, nor would he have listened to such an infamous proposal. Having succeeded in completely destroying Louis Napoleon's apprehensions as to his Republican tendencies, and having pledged himself to act in the domestic interest of the Bonapartes, a bargain was struck, by which three millions of francs were placed at Mr. Kosuth's disposal. There would appear nothing strange in this stipulation, since, to organize militarily the Hungarian Emigration, money was wanted, and why should Mr. Kosuth not receive subsidies from his new ally, the same as all the despotic powers of Europe had received subsidies from England during the whole course of the Anti-Jacobin war? However, I cannot suppress the fact that, of the millions thus put at his disposal, Mr. Kosuth at once appropriated for his own personal expenses the rather handsome figure of 75,000 francs, stipulating, besides, in case the Italian war should end without leading to the invasion of Hungary, for one year's pension for himself. Before he left the Tuileries, it was agreed that Mr. Kosuth was to counteract the suspected Austrian tendencies of the Derby Ministry, by opening a neutrality campaign in England. It is generally known how, on his return to perfidious Albion,

AFFAIRS IN FRANCE.

There is little doubt that Victor Emmanuel was "inspired" last Sunday by Louis Napoleon—that is, the inspiration was sent on cold from St. Sauveur. The sense, if not the words, of the document was concocted between the two, and the Count Arrese acted as printer's devil to carry copy from the French author to the Sardinian responsible editor. That gentlemen, whose intimate personal relations with Napoleon are well known, do certainly make a recent journey to the baths of St. Sauveur; and while he was on that journey the Tuscan delegation, whose mission was unalterably set and dried for them by the vote of an Assembly already adjourned, persisted in not starting from Florence, to the then general wonderment of all state mankind. In this coincidence people now see a consequence, and the Sardinian speech assumes the importance of a French manifesto. The Tuscans (and Victor, also,) have great reason to rely their hopes in the European Powers, and above in the generous Emperor of the French.

The probability of a European Congress is not accepted nearly as a certainty by most observers of political signs. It is plainly enough foreseen, they say, by Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel. Then the failure of the Zurich Conference is patent. But there are many points in the proposed settlement of the complex Italian Question—properly the European Question—some of them without the limits of congressional legislation, and others which both Emperors might prefer to settle between themselves rather than have brought into discussion.

For an assembly whose constituents are sovereigns, for an assembly disposing sovereigns—to sustain human rights against Divine Right—would without precedent. It is difficult to conceive how Austria should assent. I do not say so to snub her, but to their right to discuss the propriety of such an act. It would be bringing into debate the very principle of her existence as an empire. There is no need to point out when and why the French Emperor would prefer to negotiate by action of a Congress by direct negotiation with her enemy. His tenacity of purpose, his pride, his ambition as European ruler, his interest as ruler of the French, are all engaged to carry out, on what beyond the narrow Villafranca base.